In Soraya Moreno Romero v Spain, the Committee considered the situation of an evicted author who had rejected several temporary housing proposals made by social services. It found that the author had failed to provide evidence to show that the proposed accommodation “would be incompatible with human dignity, dangerous or otherwise unacceptable”. As such, it determined that the information before it did not disclose a violation of the author’s right to housing.

The author, Soraya Moreno Romero, lived with her three children at the home of her parents until May 2015. Due to the crowded situation and a lack of financial resources, she then decided to occupy a house that belonged to a financial institution. The financial institution lodged a complaint against her, before selling the house to an investment company, which lodged a further complaint against Ms. Romero. In January 2018, a Madrid Court found her guilty a minor offense of usurpation, issued her with a fine, and ordered her to leave the housing.

 Following this order, Madrid social services offered Ms. Romero three different temporary accommodation options: accommodation shared with another family; accommodation in a reception centre; or assistance to find affordable private accommodation another neighbourhood. Ms. Romero rejected the three proposals.

After an initial postponement, Ms. Romero was evicted in May 2019. Social services offered her emergency accommodation for two weeks in a reception centre or hotel. Ms. Romero again rejected the offer, choosing instead to live with acquaintances.

Before the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Ms. Romero made two claims:

• That she was evicted without adequate alternative accommodation being provided, and the eviction did not take into account her state of necessity or her situation of financial precariousness. She argued that this amounts to a violation of her right to adequate housing (article 11 para. 1).

•  That she had already been subject to a complaint from the financial institution which was the former owner of the accommodation, a complaint had been provisionally closed in 2016 and definitively closed in 2018. As such, her conviction for usurpation constituted a violation of the principle of non bis in idem (double jeopardy).

The State party highlighted the fact that the author had not applied for social housing prior to illegally occupying the house belonging to the financial institution and, moreover, had not completed her application for social housing after she had started her occupation. It argued that, as a result, the author had not exhausted all domestic remedies, as required by article 3 (1) of the Optional Protocol.  

The Committee rejected this argument and found that the communication was admissible. It stressed that, “for the purposes of article 3 (para. 1) of the Optional Protocol, “domestic remedies” are all domestic remedies available to the author who have a direct bearing on the facts at the origin of the alleged violation and which can reasonably be considered, at first glance, as useful in effectively remedying alleged violations of the Covenant.” Since the core complaint in the author’s communication is that her eviction is contrary to the Covenant, the remedies that must be exhausted are those that are directly related to the eviction, such as remedies that seek to quash the order. The author had exhausted all available remedies of this sort.  

The Committee did however note that the author had not raised her claim that her conviction for the offense of usurpation constituted a violation of the principle of non bis in idem (double jeopardy) in her appeal before Spanish authorities. As such, it considered this portion of the complaint to be inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.

The Committee then turned to consider the central question raised by the communication: whether the author's eviction amounted to a violation of the right to adequate housing.

 In answering this question, the Committee began by noting that forced evictions are prima facie contrary the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and can only be justified in the most exceptional circumstances. If it appears as though an eviction may infringe the right to housing, authorities must:

• Ensure that it complies with legislation compatible with the Covenant

• Ensure that the eviction respects the principle of proportionality between the objective lawfulness of the expulsion and the consequences of the expulsion for that person.

The Committee proceeded to outline the State's obligation to provide alternative housing to those in situations of necessity, stressing that “as a result of an eviction, a person must not be left homeless or may be the victim of a violation of other human rights.”. It made clear that whilst States may guarantee the right to housing through a “wide variety of policies”, they must aim to realise the right in “the fastest and most efficient way possible”, ensure rehousing measures are “proportionate to the state of necessity of the persons affected and the urgency of the situation”, and guarantee that alternative accommodation is “adequate”. It added that if a State can demonstrate that, despite having made all possible efforts to the maximum of their available resources, it is impossible to provide permanent alternative accommodation, they may grant temporary emergency accommodation that does not meet all the requirements for suitable alternative accommodation. 

The Committee then considered the proportionality of Ms. Romero’s eviction. It considered that, having been convicted of the minor offense of usurpation, there was a legitimate reason for her eviction. It also acknowledged that the Madrid court had “examined all of the author's complaints concerning her right to housing and assessed the proportionality of the eviction order.”

The Committee acknowledged that the author had rejected the three proposals offered to her, and there was no indication that the author had contacted social services for further information on any of the options. It stressed that “the author has not presented any evidence that would show that the temporary accommodation proposals would be incompatible with human dignity, dangerous or otherwise unacceptable”. As such, “in the absence of any other indication that the State party has failed to take all necessary steps to the maximum of its available resources to protect the author's rights”, the Committee concluded that the information before it did not disclose a violation of the author’s right to housing.